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3 Changing coalitional preferences 
among West German parties 
(a) lntroducti'on 
In 1949, deputies of ten parries and three independents were elec;ted into the first 
Bundestag (federal legislature) of the Federal Republic. At that time, it was by no 
means clear whether the high fractionalisation that had been characteristic of the 
Weimar Reichstag would continue in the new legislature. However, Adenauer 
was able to form a government coalition including only three parties which 
disposed of 52 per cent majority of the seats. 1 Throughout the fifties, a process of 
concentration among the political parties represented in the Bundestag took 
place, which reduced the number to four in 1957 and to three in 1961. lt is only 
since 1983 that, with the newly founded Green party (Die Grünen), a fourth party 
came again into the game. Nevertheless, only once, in 1957, did the Christian 
Democrats win an absolute majority in the Bundestag, and coalition govemments 
have been the rule. 
In this chapter, I shall limit myself to studying the coalitional behaviour of the 
political parties in ehe period between 1968 and 1982, when only three parties 
played a significant role in West Germany, i.e. the Christian Democratic party 
(CDU/CSU), the Social Democratic party (SPD) and the liberal Free 
Democratic party (FDP). Under the conditions of this party system, aside from 
the possibility of an all-party coalition which was never formed, three coalitions 
of two panies are possible and have in fact come into existence. In the language of 
formal coalition theory, all three are minimal winning coalitions, while only the 
Social-Liberal coalition governments of 1969, 1976 and 1980 were also smalltst-
siu roa/itions. 
Coalition theory offers two possible explanations for the fact that the Grand 
Coalition2 of the two big parties CDU /CSU and SPD lasted for only three years, 
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while coalitions ofone of the big parties with the much smaller liberal party have 
prevailed.J The first considers only payoffs in terms of portfolios which ~ill be 
larger under the latter condition. The second explanation has to do w1th the 
programmatic distances between the parties. Under the assumption of a single 
left-right policy continuum on which the FDP as the centre party is located 
somcwhere between the CDU /CSU on the right and the SPD on the left, a grand 
coalition does not fulfil the criterion of a minimum-connected winning coalition 
which predicts that coalitions will be formed between ideologically adjacent 
parties. While the assumption that the FDP is located in the centre of the party 
space has been questioned by some authors, e.g. by Grofman (1982), it will be 
shown in a later section that it is indeed correct in many respects·.• 
Thus, the smallest size as weil as the mii\imum-connected winning criterion 
both grant a pivotal role to the FDP in the West German party system. This is 
manifested in the formation of governments as weil as during their existem:e. The 
FDP decides whether a Christian Democrat or a Social Democrat is elected as 
Chancellor. All major changes in government have been initiated by the FDP. Its 
withdrawal from the long-standing Christian-Liberal coalition with the Chris-
tian Democrats in 1966 paved the way for the Grand Coalition and later for the 
fonnation of thefirst federal government without thc CDU /CSU, i.e. the Social-
Liberal coalition which took over in 1969. In 1982 its renewed turn towards the 
Christian Democrats restored the former configuration. Thus, changes in federal 
government have to date a\ways becn brought about by decisions of the party 
elites and particularly by the FDP leadership rather than by the voters whose 
voting behaviour is remarkably stable and shows no major shifts from one 
election to the next (Gibowski 1981; Troitzsch 1980: 22511). 
The pivotal role of the FDP is also bome out by the fact that it has achieved a 
higher participation rate in state and federal govemments than any other party. 
On the federal level, it was a member of 70 per cent of the federal govemments 
that havc been formed thus far (14 out of 19). In terms of the duration of its 
participation in govemments, this rate is even somewhat higher: it has 
participated in the federal govemment for 311 out of the 424 months from 
September 1949 until the end of 1984 (73.3 per cent) (cf. Haungs 1983). 
Two more characteristics of West German coalitional behaviour are worth 
~oting. Th~ first is that not all coalitions are equally likely at a certain point in 
time, even 1f they are all possible in principle (allgemeine Koalitionsfähigkeit). 
Secondly, coalitions are rarcly formed as a result of post-electoral ncgotiations 
among the parties. Instead, the intention to form a certain coalition is usually 
statcd before an election takcs place, and the public is aware beforehand of which 
govcmment will be formed under which electoral conditions.5 
In th~ li~ht of thc rcmarkab\c stability of coalition govcrnments in the Federal 
Repub~1c, 1t seems particularly interesting to study the reasons for the rarely 
occumng changes in coalition. Four factors seem of relevance in this respect. 
Tbc first and most obvious reason is groll'ing poliry differences between the 
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partners of a govcrning coalition. Partial disagreements are, of course, nonnal in 
any co-operation oftwo distinct parties. As long as the currcnt priorities allow the 
execurion of policies in which the common goals outweigh the programmatic 
differences, disagreement in less relevant policy areas can be played down by 
neglecting them, i.e. avoiding decision-making matten on which agreement 
cannot be achieved (Norpoth 1982: 17). During the Grand Coalirion, this 
strategy was explicitly followed and denominated as the Ausklammern ('discard-
ing') of controversial issues.6 
However, once the commonalities are exhausted and priorities change, either 
by intemal developments of the parries or enforced by events beyond the control 
of the party elites (e.g. the oil shock or rising unemployment rates), the strain 
within a goverr.ing coalition can become unbearable and make its dissolution 
mandatory. 
A second factor is changes in tlit degree of sympathy or Jislike be1111een the parties. 
While this will nonnally be highly interrelated with ideological distance, it 
nevertheless constitutes a dimension of its own. This becomes clear when we 
consider the inevitable frustrations arising from the continuous necessity to reach 
compromises in a coalition, or the often highly polemic style of the political 
debate between govemment and opposition. Both may lead to a higher degree of 
dislike between parties than might be expected from policy distances alone. In 
contrast, during the formation of a new coalirion and during the first time of its 
existence, sympathy and goodwill among the parties involved will be greater and 
may help to bridge policy disagreemcnts. In West Gennany, the expression 
Koalitionsklima ('coalitional climate') has become a widely used labe! for the 
degree of strain in intra..:Coalitional co-operation. 
In countries, however, where all parties are oriented towards participation in 
governmcnt, as is thc case in West Germany (Smith 1979: 137), a coalition will 
normally not be dissolved before thc opportunity to form an alternative coalition 
is available. The contours ofthis new coalition should already be distinguishable 
in a rapprochement between the new partners in policy positions as weil as in 
mutual sympathy. This is also favoured by the constitutional requirement for a 
'constructive votc of no confidence'. 
Thirdly, one can 'assume that the decision for coalitional change will also 
depend on considcrations of elccioral success, and this tends to caution against 
such a change being rapid. An erosioli in public support for rhe governing parries 
may contribute to thc dissolurion of a governing coalirion. Conversely, the 
decision to form a ncw coalition will only be made if irs parmers expect that they 
have a realistic chance to win thc next elecrion. In that respect, vorer attirudes are 
an important factor in coalitional behaviour. Competence ratings of the different 
parties, coalitional preferences and the evaluations of the present government 
will be taken into account by the party leaders, even if they can expcct that a 
certain part of thcir supporters will vote for them regardless of their coalitional 
behaviour. 
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Finally, the immediate social environment of the party leaders_ sho~ld not be 
neglected. They do not operate in a social vacuum and their behav1our 1s not only 
int\uenced by their own goals and expectations of electoral success, but also by 
the policy and coalition preferences of important reference groups such as party 
activists and party members, as well as interest groups and those parts ?f th~ mass 
media which normally support them. Thus, even if a government still en1oys a 
high amount of public support, a loss in support among tlites may contribute to its 
dissolution. 
This chapter will try to determine how far these factors have played a role in 
the formation and dissolution ofthe Social-Liberal coalition between 1968 and 
1982. Apart from references to generally available evidence, the analysis will be 
primarily based on survey data of elites and voters gathered since 1968. In order 
to study the dynamic relations between the different factors in detail and to 
determine their relative importance, time series data would, of course, be needed. 
In particular, the question of how policy disagreements are related to the decline 
in mutual sympathy between the partners of a coalition and whether these two, in 
turn, are the cause or rather consequence of a withdrawal of public support is 
beyond the scope of our data. By loolr.ing at the positions of different groups of 
elites and voters at different points in time, it is, however, possible to identify 
those groups which were ahead of others in their evaluations of parties and 
coalitions in 1968/9 andin 1981/2, i.e. opinion leaders who played an important 
role in the opinion formation during both periods of coalitional change. 
(b) Data base 
Thn:e national elite surveys carried out in 1968, 1972 and 1981 constitute the 
major data base for a systematic analysis of the changes in the coalitional 
preferences of elites. lt would go too far in the present context to describe the 
sampling design of the studies in detail.7 Suffice it to note that the positional 
approach was used to idcntify elites, and that political as weil as non-political 
clites were included in the studics. 
The political elitts include the members of federal and state govemments as 
well as the leaders of political parties and parliamentary parties (Fraktionen) on 
fcdcral and state level. Among the non-political elitts holders of leadership 
positions in other scctors were intcrviewed, i.e. in civil 'service, business, trade 
unions, mass media, etc. Although small in sir.e and oflittlc numcrical relevance 
as vote~, the non-political elites neverthelessserve as important reference groups 
for ~ht1cal leaders. Their attitudes are, thercfore, relevant for political decision-
makmg. 
In the context of the intended analysis, information on voter attitudes is 
relevant for two reasons. As was mcntioned before, voter attitudes are tak.en into 
~nt ~y the political elites. Secondly, a joint analysis of clite and voter 
arutudes 1s necessary in ordcr to study the dynamics of public opinion fonnation. 
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Table 3.1 Surveys used for the analysis 
Name of survey 
Elite survey, 1968 
Pre-election study, 196<}, population 21 years and ovcr 
Elite survey, 1972 
Pre-elcction study, 1972, population 18 ycars and over 
Elite survcy, 1981 
Population survey, 198z, population 16 years and ovcr 
8o8 
1,158 
1,825 
2,052 
1,744 
2,oo6 
Time of survey 
Jan.-May 1968 
Sept. 196<J 
Fcb.-July 1972 
Sept.--Oct. 1972 
Mar.-July 1981 
Jan.-Feb. 11}82 
lt may help to answer the question as to which groups among elites and voters 
changed their coalitional preferences earlier than others. For that purpose, an 
attempt was made to find general population surveys carried out at about the 
same time as the elite surveys. F or l 969 and l 972 the pre-election surveys of the 
German Electoral Data project' could be used. Unfortunately, the 196<} survey 
took place more than a year after the first elite survey. By that time it was already 
clear, at least to a considerable part of the West German public, that the FDP had 
moved towards the SPD, whereas this was much less obvious in 1968. The third 
general population survey used for the analysis was part ofthe WestGerman elite 
study of 1981. It was, however, carried out only at the beginning of 1982 for 
technical reasons. Table J.l gives some basic information about the six surveys 
used for analysis. 
(c) Coalitiona/ preferences ofvoters 
Tables J.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show the distributions of coalitional preferences of elites 
and voters in 1968/9, 1972 and 1981/2. The number of response categories 
dilfered somewhat between the studies, but each included the following five 
categories: 
- government by the SPD alone 
- government by the CDU/CSU alone 
- Social-Liberal coalition, SPD--FDP 
- Christian-Liberal coalition, CDU/CSU-FDP 
- Grand Coalition, CDU/CSU-SPD. 
The missing value categories (others, NA) were omitted from the computations. 
This seems justified since normally only about ro per cent ofthe respondents feil 
into one of these categories.• For the purpose of these analyses, elites and voters 
were broken down by vote intention, which can be assumed to have a decisive 
inßuence on which government one prefers. 
Apart from their descriptive value, the survey data on the development of 
coalitional preferences of elites and voters are particularly suited to studying the 
sequence of opinion fonnation. They can help to explore the degree of latitude 
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party leaders enjoy with rcgard to theircoalitional behaviour. Some auth?rs have 
claimcd that this latitude is less pronounced in West Germany than m other 
countries because strong normative expectarions ha ve developed, restricting. the 
coalitional oprions available to party leaders. In discussing coalitional behav1our 
in thc Fcderal Rcpublic, Smith concludes that 'new rules of coalitions' have been 
establishcd in 1969 which not only oblige party lcaders to declare thcir coalitio~al 
intentions before an elecrion takes place, but also to treat them as bindmg 
commitrnents for the whole legislative term (Smith 1979: 141). If this is true, 
voter reactions to changing coalitional arrangements should be particularly 
strong arid put severe limits on the latitude of party leaders. 1 t does not, however, 
preclude coalitional changes being initiated by party leaders as long as these 
nonns are not violated. 
The empirical results can shed some light on these processes by showing under 
what conditions voters are willing to follow the coalitional decisions taken by 
party dites. Survey data analysed by Norpoth indicate that the coalitional 
preferences of the voters of all parties change in accordance with the coalitional 
dccisions made by the party leadership. Between 1965 and 196q, preference for 
thc Grand Coalition increased among Christian Democratic voters from 37 per 
ccnt to 83 per cent. 
SPD voters had favoured this coalirion already in 1965 by a margin of 70 per 
ccnt, which remained constant until the 1969 election (Norpoth 1 qßo: .p9). After 
the formation of the Social-Liberal coalition, however, SPD voters reversed 
their preference ratio for the Social-Liberal vs. the Grand Coalition (Norpoth 
1980: 431f). 
No comparable change could be found among Christian Democratic and 
Liberal voters. Whercas the fonner clung to their previous choices, a majority of 
the latter had already been in favour of the new coalition before the election 
(Norpoth 198o: 432). Changes amongthe FDP votershad, thus, already occurred 
before the 1 q6q election. Support for the Christian-Liberal coalition dropped to 
a bare 23 per cent in 1969, while preference for the Social-Liberal coalition 
increased from 22 per cent to 56 per cent. 
ln counting thcse margins, Norpoth had to disregard, however, the 
considerable number of voters of the two big parties favouring a single-party 
go\·emment. Thus, for 30 per cent ofthe CDU/CSU and for 41 per cent ofthe 
SPD voters, preference for eithcr of the coalitional constellations is not known. 
Ne„ertheless, the presumption that voter preferences follow elite decisions is 
further supportcd by the sympathy ratings for the different parties. In 196q, the 
a"crage rating of Christian Democratic voters for the SPD was higher ( + 1.6) 
than that for the FDP ( + 0.4). Before the fonnation of the Grand Coalition, 
instead, both partics had got the same average score: SPD + 0.4 and FDP + o.z. 
Conversely, SPD voters in 1969 prcferred the CDU/CSU ( + 1.7) to thc FDP 
( + o. 7). ~otwiihstanding lhis, thc FDP scorcd highcr among SPD voters in 1969 
than dunng the years before. While its average sympathy score had always been 
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Table 3.2 Coalition preferenm of tlites anti voters, I<)68/9 
Percentages based on respondents with preference for one of the 
governments listed below 
CPU/CSU 
SPD-FDP -FDP CDU/CSU 
Social- Christian- -SPD 
SPD CDU/CSU Liberal Liberal Grand 
alone alone eoalition coalition Coelition 
• •<%> •(%) •(%) •(%) •(%) 
Poli1U:al tlite 
SPD 50 41 2 3 0 4 
(82.0) (4.0) (6.0J (o.o) (8.oj 
CDU/CSU 52 0 44 0 s 3 
(o.o) (84.6) (o.o) (9.6) (5.8) 
FDP 18 0 0 II 6 
(o.o) (o.o) (61.1) (JN) (5.6) 
Non-politi<:•I tlirts 
SPD supporters 223 126 14 30 50 
CDU/CSU supporters 
(57.oJ (6.3) (13.6) (0.5) (n.6) 
324 4 172 5 ..s 91 
FDP supporicn 
(1.3) (53.8) (1.6) (15.0) (28-4) 
97 7 6 31 31 lJ 
All non-political elires 
(7.4) (6-4) (J9-'f) (JJ-0) (13.8) 
688 lJ8 204 74 82 167 
(20.8) (30.7) (11.1) (12·3) (25-1) 
Population 
SPD voters 451 174 3 8o 16.J 
CDU/CSU votcrs 
(41.2) (0.7) (19.0) (0.2) (38.9) 
438 6 122 s 39 •34 
FDPvotcn 
(1.5) (30.0) (1.2) (9.6) (57.6) 
44 2 0 21 9 8 
Population total 
(5.0) (o.o) (52.5) (22-sJ (20.0) 
1,158 193 141 116 57 483 
(19.5) (14.2) (11-7) (5.8) (48.8) 
negative unril rhe presidenrial election in March 11)69, where the FDP dcpuries 
had vored for the SPD candidate Heinemann, ir becamc pasitive for the first time 
after that evenr ( +0.2). The increase for the CDU/CSU was, however, morc 
pronounccd: in Ocrober 1966, shortly bcfore the formation of the Grand 
CoaJition, it had still becn as low as - 0.3 (figures reported in Klingcmann and 
Pappi 1970: 129). Among FDP votcrs, thc CDU/CSU bad a slightlcad ovcrthc 
SPD in 1966, which was rcversed for the first time aftcr t)1e Heincmann elecrion. 
In the pre-election study of 1969, they rankcd the SPD ( + 1 .9) bettcr than thc 
Christian Dcmocrats ( + r.6). 
In 1972, after thrcc years ofSocial-Libcral coalition, prcfcrenc:e for the Grand 
Coalition oprion had gonc down to only :ao per CCJ1t arnong SPD voren. Tbc 
majority of SPD and FDP voters suppartcd the governing Social-Liberal 
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coalition whilc 58 per cent of the Christian Democratic voters preferred the SPD 
to the FDP and only 39 per cent the other way round (Norpoth r980: 429).
10 
These figures remained remarkably constant until the beginning of r982 (cf. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4). 
With regard to FDP voters, we are in the unique position that in addition to 
survey resul!s their actual voting behaviour also gives clues about coalitional 
prefercnces. In fcderal elections FDP voters, to a much higher degree than voters 
of the big parties, make use of split-ticket voting. While casting their second, 
decisive vote for the FDP !ist, many of them use the opportunity to give their first 
vote to the candidate of another party.11 Split-ticket voting was particularly 
frequent in 1972, 198o and 1983: in these elections more than half of the voters 
with a second vote for the FDP gave their first vote to the candidate of another 
party. In 1972 and 1980, the vast majority of these first votes was cast for the SPD 
candidate, while in 1983 nearly 83 per cent of them went to the Christian 
Democratic candidate (Berger et al. 1983: 558; Schultze r983: 70). 
At first glance this may look like an impressive shift ofFDP voters towards the 
newly-installed Christian-Liberal coalition. lt is, however, often maintained that 
these split-ticket voters are not genuine FDP voters, but rather supporters of 
either SPD or CDU /CSU who want the FDP to surmount the 5 per cent quorum 
necded to enter the Bundestag in order to save the existing government (so-called 
uihstimmtri). This interpretation is fostered by the fact that journalists as weil as 
politicians have indecd sometimes recommended using that strategy. 
Naturally, the ballot itself does not allow us to distinguish between these 
interpretations. But the observcd shifts in split-ticket voting should alert us to a 
major problem involved in studying electoral support for the parties over time, 
namely that a high amount ofindividual-level change in voting behaviour might 
be involved. Panel studies have regularly shown that even relatively stable 
aggregate results disguise considerable shifts on the individual level. lt cannot be 
ruled out, particularly for a small party like the FDP, that changes in coalitional 
preferences and split-ticket voting are primarily caused by an exchange of voters. 
Data on individual-level change are therefore necded in order to substantiate the 
presumption that voters change their coalitional preferences rather than their 
voting behaviour in reaction to the changing coalitional behaviour of party 
lcaders. 
In analysing the pre- and post-election panel study of 1969 and the recall 
qucstion for the 1()65 election, Norpoth was able to show that this was indeed the 
case for most of the voters of the two big panies. They accepted the coalitional 
strategies of their party leaders, and did not sanction them by withdrawing voting 
support or by means oflowcr sympathy ratings (Norpoth 1980: 434). In contrast 
to SP~ and CDU/CSU voters, howevcr, Norpoth found more serious 
fluetuat10ns among FDP votcrs in reaction to coalitional changes of the FDP. 
'Only 40% of the previous ( 1()65) FDP voters indicate a vote intention or decision 
for the party in 1969. lt comcs as no surprise that the FDP came perilously close 
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Table 3.3 Coalition preferences of e/ites and voters, 1972 
Percentages based on respondents with preference for one of ehe 
governments listed below 
CDU/CSU 
SPD--FDP -FDP CDU/CSU 
Social- Christian- -SPD 
SPD CDU/CSU Liberal Liberal Grand 
alonc alone coolition coalition Coalition „ 11(%) 11(%) 11(%) n(%) 11(%) 
Polilica{ tlitt 
SPD 110 78 0 28 2 0 
(72.2) (o.o) (25.9) (1.9) (o.o) 
CDU/CSU u8 1 110 0 7 7 
(o.8) (88.o) (o.o) (5.6) (5.6) 
FDP 47 0 0 46 0 0 
N.,,..'8/iti"•I elius 
(o.o) (o.o) (100.0) (o.o) (o.o) 
SPD &UpPOrters 456 2o6 4 182 4 41 
(47.1) (0.9) (41.6) (0.9) (9.4) 
CDU/CSU supportcrs 8o6 4 301 9 228 194 
(0.5) (40.9) (1.2) (JI.O) (26.4) 
FDP supporters 203 2 1 130 34 15 
(1.1) (0.5) (71.4) (18.7) (8.2) 
All non-politiC2l elites 1,540 214 318 325 277 261 
(15.3) (22.8) (2J.3) (19.9) (18.7) 
Non-politic11/ e/iJes: 
ulrcttd rtfertttet group1 
Media elite, SPD 
supporters 119 45 1 55 1 13 
Media elite, CDU/CSU 
(39.1) (0.9) (47.8) (0.9) (11.3) 
supporters 107 0 40 2 22 34 
Media elite, FDP 
(o.o) (.10.8) (2.0) (H-4) (34.7) 
supporters 42 1 0 28 6 2 
(z.7) (o.o) (75.7) (16.2) (S-4) 
Business cli1e, CDU/ 
CSU supporrers 320 2 102 1 u4 65 
Business clitc, FDP 
(0.7) (34.7) (0.3) (42.2) (22.1) 
supporters 59 0 0 .09 18 5 
Tradc union elilc, SPD 
(o.o) (o.o) (55.8) (34.6) (9.6) 
supporters of2 33 0 8 0 0 
(8o.5) (o.o) (19.5) (o.a) (o.o) 
P•fJ•/111iot1 
SPD vo<ers w J03 9 456 16 117 
(JJ.6) (1.0) (50.6) (1.8) (13.0) 
CDU/CSU vorcrs 666 8 350 9 107 154 
(1.3) {Ss.71 (1.4) {17.0) (24.5) 
FDP vlllcrs 122 8 4 6q 26 9 
{6.9) (J.4) {59.5) {224) (7.8) 
Population to<al z.,052 349 422 582 173 336 
(18.7) (u.7) (J1.3) (9.3) (18.0) 
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to extinction in that election, barely exceeding the s% minimum of the total vote' 
(Norpoth 1()8o: 435). 
Zülch estimates that even less than 2 5 per cent ofits voters of I 96 5 voted for the 
FDP in 1969 (1972: 87f). The assumption of an exchange of FDP voters in 
reaction to the formation of the Social-Liberal coalition in 1969 is further 
confirmed by studies showing that the FDP electorate has undergone consider-
able changes in its social composition. lt lost support among the self-employed 
old middle class that constituted its traditional voter base (Klingemann and 
Pappi 1970: 124ff; Pappi 1973: 200; Zülch 1972: 97). Although ehe FDP still 
draws a good deal ofits voters from this class, the majority of them come from the 
new middle dass whose memhers generally show much less stable pany 
affiliations {Pappi 1973: 21of). This means that the FDP does not command a 
stable, socio-economically defined voter basis, as the two big parties do, which 
can rely on majority suppon among Catholics (CDU/CSU) or trade union 
members (SPD) (Fliszar and Gibowski 1984: 70; Kaack 1980: 401f). This makes 
the party dependent on fioating voters who cast their votes according to issue 
considerations rather than traditional loyalties or stable party identification. 
Altogether, the empirical results show that norms regulating the coalitional 
behaviour of the panies coexist with a high degree of latitude for party elites to 
pursue their coalitional strategies. While Christian Democratic and Social 
Democratic voters are wi\ling to accept the coalitional policies their parties adopt 
and change their coalitional preferences in accordance with those policies, voters 
of the Free Democrats are extremely sensitive to the coalitional behaviour of the 
FDP leadership. Tbis was demonstrated in 1969, and it presumably happcned 
again in 11)112. The FDP losses after the formation of the Christian-Liberal 
coalition in 1982 were even more severe than those in the aftermath of 1969. Even 
when the party managed to retum to the Bundestag in 1983 with 7 per cent of the 
votes, it failed to surmount the 5 per cent barrier in no less than six out of eight 
state elections from autumn 1982.12 Whether the strong reactions were a 
consequence of the violation of the coalitional commitment made by the FDP 
leadership before the 198o election, namely to support Helmut Schmidt's 
govemment for the whole legislative term, is not known. The earlicr losses in the 
1969 election, where the coalitional change bad taken place while the FDP was in 
opposition, indicate, however, that the very decision to forma ncw coalition was a 
more imponant factor than the violation of the norms of 'fair' coalitional 
behaviour. 
. lt seems as if the FDP suffers foremost from its genuinely ambivalent position 
m thc W~t German cleavage system, which results in a politically heterogeneous 
v~ter has1s. lt co~tantly has to accommodace an economically conservative wing 
w1th a reform-onented Social-Liheral wing (Broughton and Kirchner, this 
,·olume). Any coalition it enters signifies a change in baJance between these 
wings, and results in a loss of the dedicated voters of the 'losing' wing. 
The survey data also give some empirical foundation to the normative 
discussion of whcther the fonnation of specific coalitions is in accordance with 
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'voter wishes'. We can realistically assume that the voters ofthe two big parties 
wish foremost that their party participate in the govemment. They give the party 
leadership the leeway to form whatever coalition it considcrs necessary to pursue 
this goal. The same, however, is not true for FDP voters. With regard to 191i9, it 
was heavily disputed whether the FDP had stated its intention to form the 
Social-Liberal coalition clearly enough before the election. While Gringmuth 
(198•: 39f), Veen(1976: 12)andZülch(1972: 78)maintain thattheparty had left 
the coalition question open during the campaign, other authors claim that it was 
not only stated in advance but also that this message had reached the FDP voters 
(Kaase 1970: •8; Smith 1979: l•o). Our data as weil as those used by Kaase and 
Zülch ( 1972: 109) show that a majority of the FDP voters in 1969 indeed favoured 
the new Social-Liberal coalition. 
In 1982 the situation was different. Our survey data show that a majority of 
63 .• per cent of the FDP voters still supported the Social-Liberal coalition. 
Thus, while the exchange of voters in l91i9 had taken place before the formation 
of the new coalition, it occurred only after the toppling of Helmut Schmidt's 
govemment in 1982. But again, FDP voters were prompt to react to this move of 
thc FDP leadership. 
(d) Coalitiona/ preferences of elites 
The results show clearly that the elites in 1968 and 1981 were weil ahead ofthe 
voters with regard to their coalitional preferences. Whereas in 1968 only one-
quarter of the non-political clites were still in favour of the then goveming Grand 
Coalition, the same was true of nearly half of the population. This is even more 
astonishing given the fact that the population survey took place more than one 
year latcr. 
One must, however, not forget that the population is in general more in favour 
of coalition governments than the elites. Whcreas in r ~8/9 more than 70 per cent 
of the political elites and more than 50 per cent of the non-political elires 
preferred a single-party govcrnment, only 3• per cent of the population did so. 
Thus, the smaller numbers for the Grand Coalition among thc elites may be at 
least partly a result of this fact. In order to control for this systematic difference 
between elites and voters, the sympathy ratings for the different parties were used 
to ascertain the numbers of the SPD elites who preferred the CDU to the FDP or, 
rather, the other way round. According to rhese, 70.8 per cent of the SPD 
politicians and 55.9 per cent of the SPD supponers13 in the elites preferred the 
FDP to the CDU, whereas more than one year later nearly •o per cent of the SPD 
voters were still in favour of the Grand Coalition. 
In contrast to the results for the SPD, the Christian Democratic politicians and 
clitc supponers were split in their second choice: 59.6 per cent of the former and 
64.8 per ccnt ofthe latter preferred the SPD to thc FDP, and can thereforc be 
classified as favouring the then existing coalition. 
Thus, already in 1968 a clear majority of the politicians of the Social-Liberal 
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Table 3.4 Coa/ition preferences of elites and voters, 1g81 /2 
Percentages based on respondents with preference for one of the 
governments listed below 
CDU/CSU 
SPD-FDP -FDP CDU/CSU 
Social- Christian- -SPD 
SPD CDU/CSU Liberal Liberal Grand 
alone alone coalition coalition Coalition 
n(%) JI eo;~) •(%) t1(%) •(%) 
PolitU:ol tlitt 
SPD 124 70 0 43 0 6 
(58.8) (o.o) (36.1) (o.o) (5.0) 
CDU/CSU 125 0 79 0 39 5 
(o.o) (6p) (o.o) (31.7) (4.1) 
FDP 25 0 0 20 5 0 
(o.o) (o.o) (80.0) (20.0) (o.o) 
Non-politica/ tlitts 
SPD voters 355 1)8 0 199 3 28 
(29.9) (o.o) (~.7) (0.9) (8.5) 
CDU/CSU vo1cr> 647 0 159 8 403 57 
(o.o) (25-4) (1.3) (64.3) (9.1) 
FDP VOICr> 283 0 3 108 129 19 
(o.o) (1.2) (41.7) (49.8) (7.3) 
All non-political clitcs 1,470 114 181 353 585 121 
(8.4) (13.4) (26.1) <u» (8.9) 
Non-polilU:ol tlitts: 
~kctti rtf<rft«t "'°""' 
Media di1c, SPD votcrs 56 9 0 ·II 0 1 
Mtdia efüc, CDU/CSU 
(17.6) (o.o) (8o.4) (o.o) (2.0) 
\.'oters 92 0 19 4 10 59 
Media clitc, FDP votcrs 
(o.o) (20.7) (4-J) (64.1) (10.9) 
s2 0 0 20 23 4 
Business dite. CDU/ 
(o.o) (o.o) (42.6) (48.9) (8.5) 
CSU vot.,.. 302 0 68 1 196 27 
Business eli1e, FDP 
(o.o) {23.3) (0.3) (67.1) (9.2) 
VOlCTS s., 0 1 6 13 54 
Trade union clitc, SPD 
(o.o) (1.4) (17.6) (7].0) (8.1) 
'•Olc:rs 69 38 0 22 1 6 
(56.7) (o.o) (32.8) (1.5) (9.0) 
Populatio• 
SPD rntcrs 528 153 3 271 4 42 
cou ;csu •otcrs (32.3) (o.6) (57-J) (o.8) (8.9) 714 6 409 8 176 # 
FDP •otcrs 
(0.9) (63.6) (1.2) (•H) (6.8) 
236 3 10 123 46 12 
Population total 
(1.5) (5.z) (6J.4) (23.7) (6.2) 2,206 187 467 456 272 137 
(12.3) (30.7) (30.0) (17.9) (9.0) 
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parties and the elite supporters of the SPD wished the new coalition. The FDP 
supporters in ehe non-policical elites were, howevcr, less clear-cut in their 
preferences. Their answers were much more dispersed over ehe whole range of 
alternatives and only about 40 per cent advocated a Social-Liberal roalition. 
Noticeably, a sizeable minority of about one-third among FDP leaders and elite 
supporters alike preferred a retum to the old Christian-Liberal coalition. 
In r97:z, the Social-Liberal coalition enjoyed nearly unanimous support 
among the politicians and elite supporters of ehe SPD and FDP alike. Even 
among FDP supporters, preference for a Christian-Liberal coalition had 
decreased eo only 18. 7 per cent. Social Democratic support for the coalition with 
the FDP again becomes clearer when we take the party rank orders into account. 
Ninety-eight per cent of the Social Democratic politicians and 87 per cent of their 
elite supporters preferred the FDP to the Christian Democrats. 
For the latter, the situation was much less comfortable. Given the consolida-
tion of the Social-Liberal government, there was little hope offonning a coalition 
with either of the other parties (Pridham 1 q82: 149 ). This is refiected in the rat her 
high number of Christian Democratic politicians who preferred a single-party 
govemment by the CDU /CSU. In che light of these ligures, the failed attempt to 
topple the govemment by co-operating with conservative FDP deputies seems to 
have been the only realiscic way to get back into office. 
The high number of respondents in the elite surveys of 1972 and 1981 as 
compared to 1968 allows a further subdivision of the supporters of the different 
parties according to their sector location. Thereby, it is possible to study the 
coalitional preferences of groups which can be assumed to be of particular 
importance to the party leaders, namely the representatives of those interest 
groups which traditionally ha ve been closely affiliated with one of the political 
parties. These are the business leaders who mainly support the CDU/CSU 
(1981: 65.8 per cent), but also the FDP (18.3 per cent), and the trade union 
leaders who are predominantly affiliated with the SPD (79.3 per cent). 
Additionally, the supporters of the three parties in the media elite have been 
analysed separately. Their coalitional preferences seem particularly important 
since they have the unique opportunity to communicate them to a larger public." 
Two results in Table 3.3 deserve special mention. Among the business leaders 
with an FDP preference, only a slight majority of 55.8 per cent supported the 
Social-Libenal coalition in 1972, whereas a sizeable minority of 34.6 per cent still 
advocated a Christian-Liberal coalition. Equally remarkable is that also 42.2 per 
cent of the CDU/CSU supporters in the business elite favoured this coalition. 
Thus, the business elite continued tobe a stronghold of advocates of a Christian-
Libenal coalition even at a time when the fonnation of such a coalition was 
extremely unlikely. 
The second interesting result concems the trade union leaders. They 
overwhelmingly favoured a single-party govemment by the SPD. While this was 
never a realistic possibility, their preference nevertheless reftects the big distance 
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between trade unions and the FDP, which posed a serious problem for the SPD 
lcadership, who had to deal with both groups. . . . 
In u}lh, a clear majority of Christian Democrats in the non-pohncal ehtes 
favourcd the formation of a Christian-Liberal coalition. On the other band, more 
than 6o per cent of the CDU/CSU leaders and voters advocated a single-p~rty 
government by the CDU/CSU. If we again take the pany rank orders mto 
account, it becomes, however, quite clear that the FDP was predominantly 
preferred over the Social Democrats. 
Among the Free Democrats, the elite supporters already showed a slight 
plurality (49.8 per cent) in favour of a coalition with the CDU/CSU. This 
majority is particularly high among the FDP supporters in the business elite (73.0 
per cent). In contrast, So per cent ofthe FDP politicians interviewed and 63.4 per 
cent of the voters of that party still clung to the Social-Liberal coalition. 
With regard to the FDP politicians, the possibility cannot be ruled out that 
those who pursued the coalitional change most actively were less willing to be 
interviewed. But even if we assume that all 15 FDP leaders who were in the 
original sample but refused to be interviewed were in favour of a coalitional 
change, it would only indicate an equal split among the FDP leadership in 198 t. 
lnstead, it seems more realistic that the actual relation was about 65 per cent to 35 
per cent in favour of the Social-Liberal coalition. The fact that the change could 
be elfected already slightly more than a year later should remind us of two basic 
reservations to be made when predicting political decisions from survey data. 
The first is that therc exist considerable differences of power even among top 
elites which cannot be accounted for in looking only at the distribution of 
attitudes. The second is the fact that political processes can develop considerable 
dynamics which cannot be studied by survey methodology. 
The data also give some suppon for the assumption that FDP leaders 
perceived the coalition question as a matter of tactics rather than conviction. 
While 8o per ccnt of thcm indicatcd a prefcrence for the Social-Liberal coalition, 
the party rank orders show that only 32 per cent of them preferrcd the SPD over 
the CDU. Fony-four per cent instead prcferred the CDU and 24 per cent gave 
equal ratings for both big parties. The respective proportions among the FDP 
supportcrs in the non-politia.1 clitcs arc the following: 33.6 per cent for the SPD, 
50.5 per cent for the CDU, and 15.9 per cent equal ratings. 
The vast majority of the Social Dcmocratic elitcs, finally, were still in favour of 
the Social-Liberal coalition. What seems, howcvcr, more imponant with rcgard 
to the SPD is that the number of supporters of a single-party govemment has 
declined since 1972. Onc cxplanation of this rathcr unexpected result could be 
that the confidcnce in thc: SPD's capability of solving the pending economic 
problems had decreased at the beginning ofthe 198os even among SPD leaders 
and supporters. Anothcr possibility which cannot be ruled out is that a number of 
conservative Social Democrats in thc elitcs, with regard to the more radical wing 
in their own party, appreciated the retarding role of the FDP more than they 
could admit in public. 
Changing coalitiona/ prefertnces in West Germany 59 
(e) Party support and the choice of coalitional strategies 
lt was said before that the perceived chances of winning electoral support 
influence the strategies followed by the political elites. Even when it could be 
shown that voters by and !arge approve of the coalitional decisions taken by the 
political leaders by changing their coalitional preferences accordingly, there are 
limits to elite manipulation of public opinion. This is not only true for FDP 
voters who are particularly prone to reacting to party decisions not in accord with 
what they consider adequate, but also for the loyal followers of the big parties, 
though to a lesser degree. 
While voter attitudes give only scarce information on what parties and 
governments should do in a certain situation, dissatisfaction with political 
outputs will inevitably lead to a withdrawal of support. Thus, voter attitudes 
serve as restrictions rather than as guidelines for elite behaviour. Accordingly, 
elites assess the current mood among the voters and calculate voter reactions to 
their own behaviour. They also have more or less accurate hypotheses as to what 
decisions will or will not be accepted. 
In this vein, voter evaluations of government performance are particularly 
relevant for coalitional behaviour, since the partners of a governing coalition are 
not normally held equally rcsponsible for it. lt seems therefore natural that each 
party tries to claim rcsponsibility for successful a.ctions while blaming failures on 
the other pa.rty or pa.rties. In thc case of a. continuous failure of a. govemment to 
cope with pending problems, such a disposition of a govemmental party will, 
however, become impossible in the long run. When this becomes apparent, the 
dissolution of the existing coalition may be considered as a rea.sonable strategy for 
party survival. 
This was obviously the case in the FDP leadership in the mid-sixties as weil as 
in the early eighties. At both times, the FDP feared that a continuation of the 
existing coalition would lead to its electoral defeat in the next election. Zülch 
reports that in 1966 the crisis of the Christian-Liberal coalition was triggered by 
severe losses of the FDP in two state elections and its following attempt to regain a 
more independent profile (1972: 24; cf. also Gringmuth 1984: 31fl). 
Voter dissatisfaction did not, however, play any role in the dissolution ofthe 
Grand Coalition in 1969. Not only did nearly 8o per cent of the respondents 
declare in the 1969 pre-election survey that the Grand Coalition had been 
successful, but nearly 58 per cent wished its Continuation after the election. The 
main reason lay, instead, entirely on the elite Jevel. In a study carried out by 
Engelmann in 1969 in which parliamentarians, party activists and voters wcre 
intcrviewed, the author found that an ovcrwhelming majority of 70 per cent of thc 
clite respondcnts thought that thc Grand Coalition was bad for democracy, 
whcreas this was only true for 26 per cent ofthe mass sample (Engelmann 1972: 
35fl). The data ofour 11)68 elite study confirm this. While 82 per cent of thc elites 
said that the formation of the Grand Coalition had been justificd undcr thc 
political conditions of 1966, 64.9 per cent claimed that its continuation would be 
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of disadvantage to dcmocracy. The most frequent arguments brought forward in 
an open-ended question were the lack of opposition (31.9 per cent) and the 
blurring of party differences ( 14.2 per cent). 
[n contraSt to this, survey data for the early eighties15 show . that _voter 
dissatisfacrion again played an important role for the fate of the Soctal-L1beral 
govemment. Satisfaction with the govemment as mcasured on a scale ranging 
from + s to - s declined from a comfortable + 1.2 in january 1981 _to an 
unprecedented low of - 0.4 in August 1982 (Berger et al. 1983: 563f). Th1s was 
particularly marked among FDP voters (decline from + 1.8 to +0.4), whereas 
SPD voters showed not only much more satisfaction with the government at both 
points in time, but also a smaller decline from + 2.9 to + 2.1. 
Similarly, if we turn to the ratings of the individual parties, it can be seen that 
the SPD suffered a continuous decrease in popular sympathy after the 1980 
election. At the turn of 1981/2 its values bad dropped below + 1.0. The FDP 
curve is of similar shape but the FDP values were nearly unifonnly higher than 
those of the SPD. At the same time the values for the CDU fluctuated around 
+ 1.3 and showed a slight increase after April 1982 (Berger et al. 1983: 562). 
The most important indicator of electoral support and the most relevant in 
terms of votes is, of course, the vote intention of the respondents. Repeated 
surveys show that the percentage of respondents expressing a vote intenrion for 
the SPD declined rapidly in the first half of 1982, while the FDP support 
remained rather stable. 
The FDP leaders were weil aware of th~ fact that the various indicators of 
support for the governmentand the governing parties pointed downwards. lt was 
thcrefore rational on their side to assume that the decline would continue and that 
the FDP, too, would be affected by it sooner or later. Thus, the conclusion to 
leave the govemmnent seems weil justified. 
A survey carried out on behalfof the FDP leadership in June/July 1981, which 
was designed to probe for the potential reactions of FDP voters to a coalitional 
change, demonstrates that the party leaders pursued exactly the same kind of 
reasoning. With an intemal paper of the FDP, which was published by the 
Frankfurter Rundschau on 22 August, the development of government and party 
popularity was analysed, followed by a report on the results of the study. These 
results also constitute the data base of a more scholarly analysis by Gibowski 
( 1981 ). They show that a majority (52 per cent) of the FDP voters advocated tbe 
gcneral norm that a coalition should not be dissolved during a legislative term. 
Sevcnty-seven per cent of them wished the continuation of thr: Social-Liberal 
coalition until 1984. Asked for their coalitional preference, 56 per cent favoured 
the Social-Liberal govemment, and 27 per cent a Christian-Liberal one (cf. the 
slightly different ,·alues of Table 3.4) . 
. The surve~ ~lso included several questions probing for voter reactions under 
different polmcal scenarios, assuming increasing difficulties in co-operation 
betwecn the FDP and thc SPD. The most pertinent question, howcver, 
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concerned the hypothetical vote intention in the event of the FDP de-
claring before the next election its intention to form a new coalition with the 
Christian Democrats. lt resulted in an overall loss of about 10 per cent of the FDP 
voters, resulting from net lasses of one-third and net gains of one-quarter. The 
title of the analysis indicates that this was deemed to be the central result of the 
survey: 'A coalitional statement [Koalitionsaussage] in favour of the Christian 
Democrats would not be fatal' (Frankfurter Rundschau). Even when Gibowski 
assumes that the predicrion of lasses is more realistic than that of potential gains 
(r981: r3f), the margin ofFDP votes for the hypothetical question comes verr 
close to the electoral return of the FDP in the 1983 Bundestag elections. 
Thus, the FDP leadership was prepared to suffer again a considerable 
exchange in voters when it left the Schmidt government in September 1982. This 
was, by the way, shortly after the opinion pol! in August 1982 which had yielded 
the above-mentioned most negative rating ever measured for a federal 
govemment (--0.4), and showed rhat rhe vote inrcnrion for the Christian 
Democrats had gone up to more rhan 50 per ccnt. The chance of an absolute 
majority ofthe CDU/CSU represented a particular danger for the FDP, sincc 
this would have deprived it ofits pivotal role in the West German party system. 
The FDP's expectation, however, that its stable voter basis exceeded the S per 
cent level was overly optimistic. Opinion polls after the formation of the 
Christian-Liberal government showed the FDP so far below the s per cent 
barrier that its return to the next Bundestag seemed doubtful (Berger et al. 1983: 
574). This was mainly due to the way in which the old government had been 
toppled, which was criticised by 6o per cent of the voters (Berger et a/. r98 3: 567 ). 
lt was only in January 1983 that the party regained the strength needed to secure 
its legislative survival. 
The data in Table 3.5 show that among the non-political elites support for ehe 
parties of the Social-Liberal coalition was already rather low in spring 1981. This 
becomes particularly evident if we compare the elites to the general public at the 
same time. The much lower ratings of the elites, though partly due eo the fact that 
the SPD generally enjoys much less support among the non-political elites rhan 
among voters,16 remain even when we control for vote inrention. This 
corroborates the presumption that political developments show themselves 
earlier in elite than in voter opinions (Wildenmann 1975: 278ff). Wildcnmann 
concludcd from thcse resulcs as early as March 1982 that 'The elites wish ehe 
change' ('Die Elite wünscht den Wechsel'). 
(f) The change in 'coalitional climate' between 197z and uj81/z 
Changing mutual sympachy ratings of the political parties can serve as an 
indicator or changes in ehe relations between ehe parties. Unfortunately, no such 
quescion had been included in the 1968 elite study, which limits the analysis to 
the years between 197:und 1981. Above, the sympathy ratings have already been 
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Table 3.5 Mean sympathy ratings for 
SPD, CDU and FDP in tlte tarly eightit1 
SPD CDU FDP 
Popula1i,,,.. 
September 198o +>.O +1.1 +1.2 
May 1q81 
All respondtn!S +1.3 + 1.3 + 1.3 
SPD •ntcrs +J.s -0.1 + 1.7 
CDU/CSU votcrs -o.6 +J.4 +0.7 
FDP votcrs +1.6 +0.5 + J.7 
April 1982 +o.6 +1.1 +0.9 
August 1<)82 +0.3 +1.4 +0.2 
October 1C)82 +1.2 +1.3 -o.8 
March 1q83 + 1.2 +1.9 -0.2: 
Non-political rli1ts, ujl/1 
All non-politicol clitcs +0.1 +1.s +0.7 
SPD supporrcrs +>.8 -0.7 +0.3 
rnurcsu supportcrs -1.5 +j.O +0.1 
FDP supportcrs +0.2 +1.2 +i.7 
• These suney results were made available by thc 
Forschungsvuppe Wahlen, Mannheim. 
used as a supplementary measure of coalitional preferences for those elite 
respondents who bad indicated a preference for a single-party govemment. In 
this section, however, the metric information yielded by the ratings will be used 
r.ither than the ordinal one. 
Most authors describe the co-operation during the first years of the Social-
Liberal government as hannonious (Gringmuth 198.r 9f; Haungs 1983: 102; 
Smith 1979: 145). This is also reßected in our data. The mutual ratings of SPD 
and FDP politicians are rather positive. At the same time, a high degree of 
polarisation between coalition and opposition parties can be seen. 
During the second half of the 197os, however, the co-operation in government 
bccame increasingly difficult. The replacement of the founders of the coalition, 
Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel, in the offices of Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor 
by Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher was presumably of more than 
just symbolic significance. Verbeugen calls it the 'turning-point' (Zäsur) dividing 
two pcriods of Social-Liberal government (198,r 59). 'The above-mentioned 
personal turnover symbolizcd at the same time a change in coalitional climate: the 
vigorous spirit (A~/bruchsstimmung] of 1969 was superseded by a persistent 
disenchantment, a concentration on matters which seemed imperative in the light 
of the deteriorating cconomic conditions' (Haungs 1983: 102). 
The sympathy ratings of the party lcaders in 1981 retlect this change rather 
clearly. The SPD and FDP have driftcd apart, while the CDU and FDP have 
moved closcr. The FDP politicians givc nearly equal ratings for SPD and CDU, 
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Table 3.6 Mean sympathy ratingsfor the 
politica/ parties, 1972 and 1981/2 
Sympathy ratings for: 
CDU SPD CSU FDP 
'91" 
SPD politicians -1.6 + 3-7 -3.6 +z.4 
CDU politicians +J.l -1.4 + '-7 -2.0 
CSU politicians +z.4 -2.0 +z.6 -1.7 
FDP politicians - r.9 +1.6 -3.6 +.p 
N011-poli1ir11/ <litts 
SPD supporters -1.0 +z.7 -3.3 +1.9 
CDU/CSU 
supporters +z.3 -o.6 +0.9 -o.6 
FDP supporters -0.1 +1.1 -2.4 +3.0 
Potala1io11 
SPD voiers -o.8 +4.0 -1.8 +1.8 
CDU/CSU voters +3.2 -o.z +z.6 -0.3 
FDP vOICrs +o.6 +1.4 -0.9 +3.2 
1981/2 
SPD politicians -1.1 +.J.J -3.0 +o.8 
CDU polilicians + ..... -2.2. +3.1 -0.7 
CSU politicians +3.8 -3.1 +H -1.6 
FDP politicians +0.5 +0.4 -2.1 +4.2 
Non-polili<al <lites 
SPD voters -0.7 +z.8 -2.8 +0.3 
CDU/CSU voicrs +3.0 -1.5 +1.5 +0.1 
FDP voters +1.2 +0.2 -1.1 +z.7 
Population 
SPD voters -0.7 +3·3 -2.0 -0.4 
CDU/CSU votcrs +3-4 -1.3 +2.2 +1.1 
FDP votcrs +0.1 +1.2 -1.5 +z.7 
though both are only slightly positive. Among the FDP supporters in thc non-
political elites, the CDU has even passed the SPD. CDU leaders and elite 
supportcrs rate the FDP less negatively than in 1972, though not (yet) positively. 
Remarkably enough, almost no rapprochement between the FDP and CSU has 
taken place: their mutual ratings are still far in the negative range. This hostility 
indicates the endemic conflict betwcen these parties in the new government. 
The results can be traced back to the avowedly strained climate within thc 
Social-Liberal coalition in the summer of 198r. Already thcy show a trend 
among the FDP towards the Christian Democrats which was even more marked 
among thc FDP elite supporters than among the FDP lcaders themselves. 
Dalton and Hildebrandt (1983), in analysing the development of distances 
bctween the voters ofthe three parties from 1961to198o, stress as a major result 
that thc perccivcd polarisation betwccn thc SPD and Christian Democrats has 
increascd considcrably, whcreas ehe distance between thc SPD and the FDP has 
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decreased during this time. Our daca supplement their analysis in an important 
way by allowing us to compare voter ratings to those of the elites. The average 
scores in Table 3.6 show clearly that the mutual evaluations among Christian 
Democrats on one side and Social Democrats on the other are more negative and, 
thus, more polarised among political elites than among party supporters in the 
non-political elites who, in turn, show more polarisation than the voters. 
The growing polarisation found by Dalton and Hildebrandt can, therefore, 
also be interpreted as a reaction of the voters to the much higher degree of 
polarisation in the elites during the seventies. This possibility is, in fact, explicitly 
mentioned by the authors. Even more interesting, however, is their presumption 
that the polarisation among the voters may escape elite control and that elites 
cannot just switch it off whenever it becomes inconvenient ( 1983: 79). 
This opcimistic assumption may, however, overrate voters' abilities to form 
political attitudes independently from elite opinion leadership. Our analysis of 
the development of coalitional preferences supports instead ehe exix;ccation that 
voters will again follow the elites' decisions. Only wich regard to the FDP voters 
does the assumption seem justified chac voter accicudes are more resistant eo the 
moves of their party. In accord with their prevailing coalitional preference, they 
still rated the SPD higher than the CDU in 1982. But the FDP leadership cries co 
overcome this resistance by deliberately taking the risk of losing a part of its 
rnters each time it changes sides, and so far ics calculations have been fair enough 
to ensure its survival. 
(g) Policy positions 
The literature. on political parties and coalitions differs with regard to the 
importance which is attributed to substantive policy positions as compared to the 
striving for power positions (Max Weber: Ämterpatronage) as a motive in politics. 
Notably, representatives ofthe economic theory ofpolitics (Downs, etc.) have 
assumed that thc latcer is the primary goal of parties whereas the substantive 
policy positions are no more than a by-product of it. 
The FDP has often been accused ofbeing in the first instance oriented towards 
participation in go\·emment regardless of its programmatic profile. If this were 
true, policy agreemcnts or differcnccs should not play any role in its coalitional 
behaviour. Our data can show whcther the shifting coalitional preferences of thc 
~DP l~ader~ and FDP supporters in the elites wcre also accompanied by 
mcreasmg d1fferenccs over policics in the recent Social-Liberal coalition. 
The analysis will be limited to a comparison of the issue positions of elites 
between 1~72 and 1981. The index scores in Table 3.7 were computed from a 
number of 1ssue Statements which the respondcnts bad to rate according to their 
degree of approval/disapproval. The indices tap three distinct issuc areas which 
have eme~ged as the main domains of political conflict between the parcies in 
1972 : SOCJal policy, foreign policy and economic policy (Hoffmann-Lange et al. 
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Table 3.7 lssue positions of elites in three issue areas, 1972 and rg8r 
1972 
Social Foreign Economic 
Political elitc n policy policy policy 
Po/ilic4/ elite 
SPD 110 5.0 3-~ 4.1 
CDU/CSU rzS 3.6 2.3 2.8 
FDP 47 5.0 3.7 3.3 
Non-po/itica/ elites 
SPD supponcrs 456 4.q 3.9 3.9 
CDU/CSU supponers 8oo 3.7 z.6 2.6 
FDP supponcrs 203 H J.4 3.1 
1q81 
Polilic4/ e/iu 
SPD 124 5.3 4.3 4.6 
C."DU/CSU •2s 2.8 2.7 2.4 
FDP 25 4.7 3.6 2.5 
Non-po/itical eliw 
SPD supporters 318 4.8 4.2 4.2 
CDU/CSU supporters 670 2.Cj 2.9 2-4 
FDP supportcrs 214 3·7 J.6 2.6 
1980: 55ff). Although the individual statements differed somewhac between 1972 
and 1981, the indices should allow c-0mparisons overtime as longas the results are 
interpreted cautiously (cf. Hoffmann-Lange 1986). 
In 1972, the elite attitudes showed clearly that the common basis of the Social-
Liberal coalition lay in the fields offoreign policy (derente policy; Ostpolitik) and 
social policy (e.g. liberalisation of criminal law, introduction of comprehensive 
schools). In economic policy matters the FDP was instead somewhat closer to the 
Christian Democrats. 
The basic pattern has not changed much in 1981, but some noticeable shifts 
have occurred. Tlie FDP has moved even closer to the Christian Democrats in 
economic policy. The politicians of both parties occupy practically identical 
positions, while at the same time the polarisation between them and the Social 
Democrats has increased. In foreign policy, the FDP has moved into a position 
between the two big parties. By looking at the individual issue statements plus an 
additional question concerning a general evaluation of detente policy, one can 
characterise the FDP position as at the same time pro-American andin favour of 
detente policy. The Christian Democrats, instead, combinc a pro-American 
stance with a more traditional anti-communism, while the Social Democrats 
favour detente policy and advocate somewhat more independence from US 
foreign policy. In social policy, finally, the FDPisstill closertothe SPD in 1981. 
These results correspond to those Niedennayer has found for party dclegates, 
namely that there are two basic cleavage lines deeply rooted in the value 
orientations and organisational affiliations of FDP politicians ( 1982: 9off). The 
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social reformism axis divides in our data, as weil as in his, persons with and 
without religious affiliations and also corresponds closely to the number of 
postmaterialists. The economic conflict divides trade union members from non-
members. Foreign policy attitudes constitute a third dimension which is, 
however, not rooted as deeply and bandled more pragmatically. 
Verbeugen, as weil as Norpoth (11)82), gives similar characterisations of tbe 
basic cleavage structure in West Germany. Verbeugen claims that agreement in 
economic and foreign policy constituted the basis of the Christian-Liberal 
coalition already from tbe beginning of the Federal Republic, whereas the FDP 
always had more in common with tbe SPD in the fields of interior, judicial and 
educational policy ( 1984: 29). This pattern changed during the second half of the 
sixties wben the FDP started to advocate a more active policy towards Eastern 
Europe, wbich became the common basis of the Ostpolitik initiated together with 
the SPD. 
Compared to our data, however, Norpotb (1982: 15f) tends to locate the 
FDP position too far to the right on economic policy and too far to the left on the 
dimension be labcls 'Religion and Culture'. While this may be true for some 
issucs on wbich the FDP takes particularly pronounced positions (e.g. welfare 
policy, immigration policy), it does not seem justified for the overall position of 
this party. Our data instead support ehe notion of the FDP as a centre party in all 
three issue areas, whose position oscillates between those of the two big parties. 
Tbis is further confirmed by the self-placement of the respondents on the left-
right scale. The FDP leaders place tbemselves rigbt in the centre of the 1 o-point 
scale (5.3), whereas the SPD lcaders have an average score of 3.8, and the CDU/ 
CSU leaders 6.1. 
The data on tbe issue positions of the party leaders show that the distance 
between the SPD and FDP increased between 1972 and 1981 in all three issue 
areas, but most markcdly in questions of economic policy. On tbe otber band, the 
CDU/CSU-FDP distance diminished in economic and foreign policy, while it 
remained constant in the fü:ld of social policy. 
Our data confirm tberefore that an increased conflict over economic policy 
dh·ided tbe parties of tbe Social-Liberal coalition in 1981. This conftict was also 
tbc main rcason for the definite end of the coalition in 1982. Given the high 
saliencc attributed 10 economic matters at the beginning of the 198os as compared 
to social policy and forcign policy, the coalitional change was justified on grounds 
of substantial policy dilfercnces. 
Tbis can be furthcr substantiated by looking at the policy priorities of the 
~cspondcnts. Tbc answers given to an open-ended question concerning the most 
1m~tant problems of the Federal Republic show that the high salience 
attnbuted to Ostpol~tik a~d to educational policy in 1972 bad given way to 
concerns about secunty pohcy, energy policy and employment policy in 1981 (cf. 
Hoffmann-Lange 1986). 
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Table 3.8 Issut positions of FDP politicians anti FDP supporters among non-
politica/ elites according to second rank in party rank ordtr, ujJ1 
For comparison: First rank: FDP F or comparison: 
SPD politicians Sccond rank: Second rank: CDU/CSU 
SPD CDU politicians 
Social policy 5-3 4.5 3.5 2.8 
Foreign poliey 4·3 4.0 3.4 2.7 
Economic policy 4.6 3.0 2.J 2.4 
The role policy questions played in the final stage of the Social-Liberal 
govemment can also be explored by loo.king for sysrematic policy dilferences 
within the FDP. This was done by breaking FDP respondents down by the party 
they had ranked second in sympathy. Since the number of FDP leaders 
interviewed (n = 25) was too small to allow a further subdivision, they were 
analysed together with the FDP supporters in the non-political elites. The 
analysis revealed clear differences in the expected direction as the values in Table 
3.8 show. These results again closely parallel those ofNiedermayer, who found 
similar differences (1982: 109). 
(h) Conc/usion 
The analysis has shown that coalitional decisions are mainly elite decisions. The 
results indicate that voters only react to these decisions, either by changing their 
opinions in the same direction or by deserting the party. Whereas the first 
reaction is more typical for the voters of the Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats, the latter is more frequent among FDP vorers. 
The fact that party supporters in the non-political elites have been found tobe 
more in agreement with the party leaders than voters can be traced back to two 
different reasons. The lirsr is that they are more aware ofthe political changes 
going on within the political parties, and therefore react earlier to them than 
ordinary voters. Another and more likely explanation is that they are themselves 
involved in the opinion formation process which precedes the decision-making of 
the political parties. This should be particularly true for the media c:lites and the 
big pressure groups. These groups did not, however, ditfer.much from the other 
party supporters in the non-political elites in their coalitional preferences, and 
are, hence, not ahead of the other elites. One important exception has tobe noted, 
however. The supporters ofthe FDP in the businesselite have never favoured the 
Social-Liberal coalition to the same extent as thc other FDP supporters, let alone 
the FDP leaders themselves. In 1982, they were the mostactive promoters ofthe 
formation of the currcnt Christian-Liberal government. Attempts to inftuence 
the intra-party balance by giving financial support to members of the 
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(economically) conservative party wing are particularly noriceable in this respect 
(Verbeugen 1984: l 3 l ). Some of the details of this practice were revealed during 
the continuing investigations concerning illegal donations to the parties by 
business corporations and individual businessmen (Parteispendenaffere). 
Tbc change in coalition was accompanied, in 19"9 as weil as in 1982, by 
changes in the sympathy ratings for theparties by elites and voters. In 1981/2 the 
same was true for issue anitudes. Given the centre position ofthe FDP, which on 
one ofthe major cleavage lines, i.e. social policy, is closer to the SPD while it is 
closer to the CDU/CSU in economic policy, it seems natural that a change in 
coalition reflects more a change in policy priorities than in substantive policy 
positions. But the data revealed that shifts in the latter have taken place, too, thus 
driving the FDP nearer to the Christian Democrats for two reasons. 
While the results have shown that elites take a more active parr in coalirion 
fonnation than voters, this does not mean that they are unresponsive to public 
demands. The FDP reactions to the decline in support for the Social-Liberal 
coalition in 1982 have demonsrrared rhis rather forcefully. 
Notes 
1. Therc arc formally two independent Christian Democratic panies, the CDU and its Bavarian 
'sistcr party', thcCSU (Christian Social Union). Though both ditfer somcwhat in organisational 
structurc and ideological appeal, it sccms justified to treat them as a single party, particularly 
sincc thei· do not competc for \'otes. The CSU is limited 10 Bavaria wherc the CDU, in turn, has 
no regional party otpnisation. 
2. Thc Grand C:O.lition bctwecn CDU/CSU and SPD is sometimes called Grcat Coalition, e.g. by 
Engelmann (1972) and Mcrkl (1970), but the tcrtn Grand Coalition is more common and will 
thereforc bc uscd herc. 
3· Thcre is agrcemcnt in thc literature to rcgard the time of thc Grand Coalition as a transitional 
period ('interludc') bctwecn the Christian-Liberal and the Social- Liberal pcriod. Cf. Haungs 
1983: 9411; '\;orpoth 11j82: 13. 
~· '\;orpoth (1982: 131f) distinguishes four indcpendent though rclated issue dimensions on which 
the FDP assumes.ditfercn! positions i•is-d-vis thc two biger partics. Though not implausiblc in 
_ many rcspccts, his analyt1c approach is highly imprcssionistic. 
>- Thu•: the quest".'" of wh1ch gm·emment coalition will be formed docs not normally play a role in 
coah~1on ncgot1at1ons. lnstcad, rhcsc are rnainly conccmed with policy questions 
(~<g„rungsprogramm) and thc distribution of portfolios among the partics. Cf. Smith 1979; 
'\;orpoth 1982: ICj. 
6. E'·~n _if ~·c as.~umc tha~ co-opc"':tion and nor confrontation prcvails in a go,·crnment coalition, 
pohc! _dilfcrcnccs.cnntmuc to nm, and can be traced back to different programmatic outlooks. 
I? • Chrts11an·L1bcral coalmon, the FDP as•umcs thc rolc of a 'liberal corrccti.c' (li,,,ral<S 
1.:"mfot·) wnh_regard to thc law and order policy advocatcd by the Christian Democrats, whilc 
~t pla~·s 1_rctar~1ng rolc (~~emsC'~) "·ith rcgard to Social Dcmocratic statc intcrventionist policics 
·~ a Sooal-L1heral coaht1on. Cf. '.'lorpoth 1982: 13; Smith 1979: 145. 
1· ~ hc s~udies ~·crc conduc~~d by rcsearch tcams at thc üni\'crsity of ~1annheim. Principal 
mvcsugator U• Rudolf\\ lldenmann ( 1972, together with Werner Kaltcftcitcr, University of 
Kiel. and 1q81, togcthcr wuh Max Kaasc, Uni"ersity of Mannheim). 
h ~achinc-rea~blc cod~~ks which also includc an outline of the study designs are availahlc at 
~ e . i:ntralarch"· f~rempmsch~ Sozialforschung, Colognc. Elite Survey 1968. ZA No. 1138; Elite 
uncy 197_z, ZA No. 0796; Elue Suf\·ey 1981, ZA No. 1139. 
8. ~hese stu~ics are also documented in machine-rcadable codcbooks: p...,_.,lcction study 1C)69, z• 
· o. 0426, Pre-clec11on study 1972, ZA No. o635. 
9. One exception is the general population survey, 198>, where morc than 30% of the respondents 
did not indicate a preference for one of the coalitions on the !ist. The main reason for this may be 
that this study was carried out at a time when no eleaion was imminent: hence, it also had a much 
higher numher of respondents (26.3%) who did not even indicate a vote intention. An additional 
6. 1% wanted 10 vote for the Greens or other panies instead of the 1hrce 'established' parties. Of 
thesc, altogether 728 respondents, only 28. 7%, indicated a prefercnce for one of the coalitions on 
the !ist. 
10. In the 1972 prc-election study respondents with a prcferencc for a single-party govemment (cf. 
Tablc 3.3) were further probed to indicatc their coalitional prcfercnce if such a government 
should not be fcasible. Norpoth reports the distribution for the latter question. 
11. According 10 the West German electoral law each votcr has 1wo votes. The second one is cast for a 
party list whilc the first onc is for the con.•tituency candidatc. With the first votes, candidates are 
clcctcd dircctly by simple plurality rulc. These direcl seats won by a pany are, however, 
subtracted from the overall number uf seats this party has won in terms ofsecond votes: i.e. the 
distribution of seats in thc Bundestag is ultimately determined by the second votes. Reeords 
about split-1icke1 voting arc part ofthc representative voting statistics ofthe Federal Bureau of 
Census(Statistisches Bundesamt) which collects information about voting behaviour according 10 
agc cohons and gender in a rtp~ntative sample of constiluencies. 
12. This is, however, at least pardy also the result of a sccular dccline of the FDP in state elcctions 
sincc the 197os for which no convincing cxplanation has so far bcen brought forward. 
13· In thc elite surveys of 1968 and 1972, rtspondents were not asked for thdr vote intention. Party 
suppon was instead mcasured as lhe first rank in a rank order of the parties according to 
sympathy. 
14. I am well awarc of the fact that the 11titudes ofthe media elites an: not an adcquate indicaror of 
mass media eovcrage, which would have rcquired contcnt analyses. But, nevcrtheless, thc 
changes which occum:d among the mcdia elites shoufd at least panly reJlcct what was going on at 
the mass mcdia level. 
15. Source: regular survcys ofthe Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim. l am gn:atly indcbred to 
Wolfgang G. Gibowski for having made unpublished figures available. 
16. In all three elite survcys, no more than onc-third of thc non-pofi<ical elites indicated a prtference 
for the Social Democratic pany, though with marked dilferences bctween elire sectors. Social 
Democrats are particularly wcak among busincss elites and particularly strong among trade 
union clites. 
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